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INTRODUCTION
Authors' rights as established in the copyright laws of most coun-
tries have two components. First, economic rights, rights to obtain
remuneration in return for the right to publish the work, and second,.
moral rights, rights to prevent mutilation or distortion of the work, to
receive authorial credit for the work, to decide when the work is com-
plete and can be sent forth into the world, and, in some countries, the
right to withdraw the work. The rights of authors to obtain redress from
those who alter or mutilate their work or deny their authorship of it are,
in particular, the subject of considerable controversy in the United
States. These rights have received extensive treatment in scholarly legal
journals in the United States.' Those articles have primarily discussed
the nature of moral rights and their recognition or lack thereof in U.S.
law, or the impact of the United States' accession to the Berne Conven-
tion2 on the law of moral rights in the United States. When these
scholars look to moral rights law abroad, they do so primarily with a
1. Much, though by no means all, of the discussion arose during the debate over the
United States' accession to the Berne Convention and drafting and passage of the Visual
Artists Rights Act. An admittedly incomplete list of works includes: Ralph S. Brown,
Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'v U.S.A. 196 (1988); Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward
a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945
(1990); Edward J. Damich, A Critique of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, 14 NOVA L.
REV. 407 (1990); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477 (1990); Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation:
The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 422 (1990); Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never:
Implementation of the 1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171 (1989); John
Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976); Martin
A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Cre-
ators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940); James M. Treece, American Law Analogues of the
Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487 (1968); Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note,
Between Thought and Possession: Artists' "Moral Rights" and Public Access to Creative
Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291 (1993).
2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for
signature Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), 7 CopY-
RIGHT 135 (1971) (as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The
Berne Convention is the charter of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (the Berne Union). State of the International Union on January 1, 1971, 7
COPYRIGHT 6 (1971).
[Vol. 16:545
Winter 1995] Authors' Moral Rights in Non-European Nations 547
normative eye, seeking to consider foreign law as an example, positive
or negative, in the debate over the reform of U.S. copyright law.3
With the United States' accession to the Berne Convention and the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,4 and
thus to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Proper-
ty (TRIPS),' the issue of moral rights in foreign countries can no longer
be viewed as a purely academic question of comparative law and Ameri-
can law reform. The TRIPS agreement requires that parties to the agree-
ment provide protection equivalent to that of the Berne Convention.6
While the moral rights guarantees of the Berne Convention7 are specifi-
cally excluded from enforcement under TRIPS,8 countries joining the
Berne Union will have to meet the moral rights requirement of article
6bis, and these rights will be available to foreign authors under the
national treatment requirements of Berne. 9 The issue of moral rights in
non-European0 countries will be increasingly important to authors,
publishers, movie directors, and producers because many such countries
have joined the GATT," or already are Berne members. 2
The United States has consistently objected to the express recogni-
tion of moral rights,' 3 and moral rights were a longstanding reason that
3. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing availability and reform of moral
rights in U.S.; appendix provides a limited survey of foreign moral rights laws).
4. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1318 (1994),
selected texts reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter GATT Uruguay Round]
(citations to GATT Uruguay Round materials will be to I.L.M. when therein).
5. GAIT Uruguay Round, annex IC (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights), 33 I.L.M. at 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
6. Id. art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
7. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis, 7 COPYRIGHT at 137.
8. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
9. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 7 COPYRIGHT at 136.
10. This note will use the term "non-European" to refer generally to those countries
outside Europe and North America. The term is intended to include, without careful dis-
tinction, "developing countries" and "newly-industrialized" countries, and, indeed, anything in
between or beyond.
11. Some 88 nations. GAIT Uruguay Round, supra note 4, H.R. Doc. No. 316 at 1324.
12. As of January 1, 1994, 105 states had joined the Berne Union, although not all states
were parties to all revisions of the treaty nor had the treaty entered into force as to all of
them. Twenty-three states have joined the Berne Convention since the beginning of 1990.
Treaties in the Field of Copyright and Neighboring Rights Administered by WIPO: Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 30 COPYRIGHT 7 (1994)
[hereinafter Berne Members]. As of November 1994, an additional 2 states had joined:
Tanzania, id. at 123, and Lithuania, id. at 196.
13. See David Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal
Copyright Conventions, Part Two, 17 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 715, 731 &
n.154 (1986). [hereinafter I.I.C.].
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the United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989.14 U.S.
common law and trademark causes of action do provide some analogous
protections.15 In addition, some individual states have enacted moral
rights laws. 16 During the debate over the United States' accession to
Berne, despite the inadequacy of moral rights protection noted by many
observers, the United States declared that current U.S. law provided
sufficient moral rights protection.' 7 The 1990 passage of the Visual
Artists Rights Act' perhaps gives the lie to this statement. The VARA
extends moral rights protection to a very limited class of artistic crea-
tions.' 9
The movie industry appears to be the most vocal opponent of moral
rights in the United States. 20 Movie producers are concerned about the
divorce of copyright from moral right. In the United States, a movie's
copyright lies in the producer.2' In the now famous Huston case, the
French Cour de Cassation 22 held that the heirs of John Huston, the
director of the film The Asphalt Jungle, had standing to sue to prevent
14. Hatch, supra note 1, at 184 (adoption of broad moral rights. protection could "alter
drastically current copyright relationships"); Brown, supra note 1, at 200, 205-06.
15. See generally Roeder, supra note 1; Treece, supra note 1. These causes of action
include common law copyright, trademark law, and contract law, bui they fall far short of the
guarantees provided by the droit moral.
16. Joshua H. Brown, Creators Caught in the Middle: Visual Artists Rights Act Preemp-
tion of State Moral Rights Laws, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1003, 1004 (1993) (listing
eleven states with moral rights protections).
17. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, § 2(3), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (the BCIA and current law satisfy all U.S. obligations under the Berne
Convention); Brown, supra note 1, at 204-05 (discussing legislative proposals for im-
plementation); Hatch, supra note 1, at 186-90 (discussing legislative maneuvering over moral
rights).
18. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
19. The extent of VARA preemption of state laws that may, in fact, have provided
broader protection than VARA is uncertain, and will depend in part.on the specific provisions
of the state law. See Brown, supra note 16, at 1006-31.
20. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the American movie industry was concerned
about issues of moral rights and of a "cultural exemption," for films pressed particularly by
France. See James Ulmer, GAiT Gap: Across the Great Divide, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 12,
1993, available in LEXIS, Entert Library, Holrep File. U.S. film directors and others urged
inclusion of moral rights in TRIPS. See GATT: European and U.S. Film Directors and
Writers Urge Action on Copyright, TECH EUROPE, June 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Eurtch file; Deborah Young, Venice Fest Session Seeks to Bridge U.S., Europe Gap,
DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 7, 1993, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dlyvty File. But see
Jeffrey L. Graubart, Industry Fails to Rally for Rights, BILLBOARD, May 7, 1994, at 8.
21. Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and Exploitations in International
Private Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston Film Colorization Controversy, 15
COLIM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 135, 136 (1991).
22. France's highest court.
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the French broadcast of the colorized version of the film. 23 This decision
epitomized the danger to producers of acceptance of moral rights doc-
trine as a limitation on the ability to derive economic benefits from the
copyrights they hold.24 It also, of course, demonstrates the possible
impact of foreign moral rights laws on United States copyright holders
and authors. Another film controversy, over Terry Gilliam's film Brazil,
may also have worried movie producers.25 While it was no doubt bad
enough that the director had the effrontery to publicize his disenchant-
ment with the producer's desire to alter the film, providing him with a
cause of action would appear intolerable.
This note undertakes to examine authors' moral rights in non-
European countries. Section I will provide a brief comparative
description of moral rights. Section II will discuss the treatment of
moral rights in the Berne convention and the TRIPS agreement. Section
III will then examine moral rights law in India and Israel, and two
important cases from these nations, Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas
Pictures,26 from India, and Qimron v. Shanks,27 from Israel. Mannu
Bhandari deals with an author's moral right in the film adaptation of her
work, Qimron with the moral rights of a scholar in the reconstruction of
one of the Dead Sea Scroll texts. Finally, Section IV will discuss the
economic rationale for moral rights and the role of moral rights in
non-European countries.
23. Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 Bull. Civ. I, No. 172 (Fr.) (Huston
v. la Cinq). For thorough discussions of the case, see Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 21;
Paul E. Geller, French High Court Remands Huston Colorization Case, 39 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y U.S.A. 252 (1992).
24. See Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 21, at 151-57.
25. Terry Gilliam, director of the movie Brazil, fought a public battle to prevent the
producers of the film from changing the unhappy ending of the film to one that they felt
would have greater audience acceptance. The story is told in detail in Rudolph Carmenaty,
Terry Gilliam's Brazil: A Film Director's Quest for Artistic Integrity in a Moral Rights
Vacuum, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 91. The relation of the controversy to the divulgation
right is discussed in Settlemyer, supra note 1, at 2294-95.
26. Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd., 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) 13 (1986). An
edited version is reprinted in 20 I.I.C. 109 (1989).
27. Qimron v. Shanks, 3 [5753-1993] Pesakim shel Bete ha-Mishpat ha-Mehoziyim be
Yisrael [Judgments of the District Courts of Israel] [P.M.] 10 (D. Jerusalem 1993) (Copies of
the official report and of an unofficial translation of the slip opinion on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law. The translation will be cited in parallel with the official
reporter.). The decision is currently on appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court; the appeals will
probably not be heard before 1996 or 1997. Letter from Shanah Glick, Clerk to Justice Dalia
Dorner, Israeli Supreme Court, to Jeffrey Dine, Note Editor, Michigan Journal ofInternation-
al Law (received Mar. 15, 1995) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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I. MORAL RIGHTS DEFINED
A. The Nature and Forms of Moral Rights
The rationale that underlies moral rights is that the rights of an
author, in the broad sense of a creator of an original work, in her work
include not only rights required to derive financial benefit from it, but
also rights to protect the author's investment of her own creative energy
and personality in her work. In a classic American exposition on moral
rights, one author states that:
The copyright law, of course, protects the economic exploitation of
the fruits of artistic creation; but the economic, exploitive aspect of
the problem is only one of its many facets. . . . When an artist
creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a
musician, he does more than bring into the world a unique object
having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part
of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use.
There are possibilities of injury to the creator other than merely
economic ones; these the copyright statute does not protect. Nor is
the interest of society in the integrity of its cultural heritage pro-
tected by the copyright statute.2"
France is normally held up as the model for moral rights law,29 but
many Western European civil law countries espouse the doctrine, with
some variation.3° The doctrine's origin is entirely judicial, perhaps
unusual in a legal system that stresses legislative over judicial lawmak-
ing.31
There are four basic rights that constitute the droit moral; not all
systems recognize all of them. They are: the right of publication (droit
de divulgation), the right of paternity (droit de paternitg or droit au
respect du nom), the right of integrity (droit de respect de l'oeuvre), and
the right of withdrawal (droit de repentir or de retrait).32 Each of these
28. Roeder, supra note 1, at 557. As an example of protection against the "ravages of
public use," an Israeli court recognized the right of a sculptor to enforce the maintenance of
his work in Tumarkin v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, summarized in News Section:
National Reports, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. D-67 (1992) [hereinafter E.I.P.R.].
29. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 1; Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral
Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1968).
30. See Kwall, supra note 3, at 3; Merryman, supra note 1, at 1025.
31. Merryman, supra note 1, at 1026.
32. CLAUDE COLOMBET, GRANDS PRINCIPES DU DRoIT D'AUTEUR ET DES DROITS
VOISINS DANS LE MONDE: APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARI 42-51 (2d ed. 1992); Sarraute,
supra note 29, at 467; see also STEPHEN STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
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rights is compound, each consisting itself of a small bundle of rights.
The right of publication is the right of the author to, choose whether
or not to present her work to the public.33 As one author notes, it pro-
tects the artist from having her "lack of inspiration ... considered to be
a breach of contract."34
The right of paternity is the right to claim authorship of one's work,
to prevent others from unjustly claiming authorship, and to prevent
having one's name falsely associated with another's work.35 The right of
paternity includes the right to publish pseudonymously.36
The right of integrity includes the "right to authorize or prohibit any
modification of [the author's] work, '37 and to protect against distortion
of the work.38 It also includes the right to prevent mutilation of or
derogatory action toward the work.39 This was the right at issue in the
Buffet case, where the buyer of a refrigerator painted by Bernard Buffet
attempted to sell the individual painted panels of the refrigerator sepa-
rately; the court enjoined the sale.'
The right of withdrawal is the least exercised moral right. Its formal
existence is rare outside France and countries that derive their law from
France. 4' There is wider recognition of a right to make corrections,
particularly in later editions.42 The author may be required to pay dam-
ages when he withdraws a work from circulation, as is clearly the case
in Spain.43 The right of withdrawal may exist in common law countries,
but only under compelling circumstances and in very limited casesA4
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 73 (2d ed. 1989) (omits the right of retraction).
33. Sarraute, supra note 29, at 467. The archetypal right of publication case is the French
case Whistler v. Eden; the painter Whistler had painted on commission a portrait of Lord
Eden's wife. After brief public display, he refused to deliver the painting and erased the
subject's face. Id.; Merryman, supra note 1, at 1024. For the subtle distinctions between
publication, placing in public view, disseminating, and other terms, see COLOMBET, supra
note 32, at 42.
34. Sarraute, supra note 29, at 468.
35. STEWART, supra note 32, at 73.
36. WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights 161,
WIPO Publ. No. 827 (EFR) (Jan. 1981) [hereinafter Glossary]; COLOMBET, supra note 32, at
45.
37. STEWART, supra note 32, at 73-74.
38. Id.
39. Glossary, supra note 36, at 161.
40. Merryman, supra note 1, at 1023.
41. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 50.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 51.
44. STEWART, supra note 32, at 73.
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Even French commentators question the efficacy of the right of with-
drawal.45
B. Duration And Alienation of Moral Rights
The duration of moral rights varies significantly among nations. In a
minority of states, moral rights either have the same duration as the
copyright,46 or endure for a different term of years after the death of the
author.47 Many nations, however, recognize moral rights generally in
perpetuity without distinction among works by individual authors. or
collective works,48 including France and many Francophone countries.49
Other countries recognize the perpetuity only of certain rights, pnimarily
the rights of integrity and attribution. ° According to one commentator,
the need for a perpetual moral right is "justiffied] by the longevity of
the work, which survives the extinction of the monopoly and continues
to carry the expression of the author's personality.' One French author
thus finds the idea of temporal limitation of the rights of integrity and
attribution "shocking. 52
The ability to transfer moral rights varies from country to country.
The World Intellectual Property Organization's definition of moral rights
states that "[m]ost of the copyright laws recognize moral rights as an
inalienable part of the copyright, distinct from the so-called 'economic
rights."'53 The Berne Convention apparently does not require inalien-
ability, however. While Berne requires that moral rights not pass as part
of copyright, it does not expressly require that the rights be inalienable;
indeed, a French proposal to introduce inalienability was defeated.
5 4
45. Sarraute, supra note 29, at 477.
46. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 51 (states include Barbados, Guatemala, Luxembourg,
and the Low Countries).
47. Id.; W.R. Cornish, Moral Rights Under the 1988 Act, 12 E.I.P.R. 449, 449, 451
(1989) (new English Copyright Act provides protection only while work remains in copy-
right); Robyn Durie, UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 20 I.I.C. 637, 650 (1989).
The Berne Convention generally prescribes a copyright term of at least 50 years after the
death of the author; special rules apply to motion pictures, anonymous or pseudonymous
works, and photographs. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 7, 7 COPYRIGHT at 137.
48. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 52. Note, however, that the right of retraction is
generally viewed as exercisable only by the author. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. H. DESBOIS, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 470 (3d ed. 1978).
52. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 52.
53. Glossary, supra note 36, at 161. Desbois states that "the author cannot renounce the
defense of his personality, under pain of committing 'moral suicide."' DESBOls, supra note 51,
at 470.
54. STEWART, supra note 32, at 74.
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C. Moral Rights Laws Outside Europe
While there is universal recognition of the author's right "to affirm
his paternity in a work, or to defend his integrity in it," there are two
approaches to enforcement of these rights.5 The civil law countries of
Latin America, Africa, and East Asia spell out the right with par-
ticularity in their copyright laws,56 while the common law countries
generally leave moral rights to.the protection of the courts.57 Statutory
recognition of moral rights has grown, however, in common law coun-
tries.58 For example, India,59 Israel, 6° and other nations have adopted
moral rights legislation within their copyright law, while the United
States has adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act,6' and Australia has
undertaken consideration of moral rights. 2
The countries that protect the right of divulgation as part of copy-
right law are civil law counties and countries whose law derives from
the civil law. The right is apparently widely respected, with variation as
to extent and statutory wording.63 Common law countries provide such
protection under the law of privacy or secrecy, 64 and through the refusal
to specifically enforce personal service contracts.65
Fewer countries, as noted above, recognize the right of withdrawal.'
Only France and countries deriving their law from France protect it
extensively. 67 Some other countries, including Spain, which historically
55. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 40; see also Adolf Dietz, The Artist's Right of integrity
Under Copyright Law: A Comparative Approach, 25 I.I.C. 177 (1994) (discussing nature and
recognition of the right of integrity in a number of countries).
56. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 40.
57. Id.
58. England adopted moral rights provisions in 1988. See Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 77-89 (Eng.).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 106-12.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 113-15.
61. Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, and other sections) [hereinafter VARA]. For a critical
examination of the VARA, see Peter H. Karlen, What's Wrong with VARA: A Critique of
Federal Moral Rights, 15 HASTINGS COMM. ENT. L.J. 905 (1993).
62. Australia, 16 E.I.P.R. D-194 (1994).
63. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 42-43.
64. Id. at 43.
65. Roeder, supra note 1, at 559 (equity would not enforce contract to produce painting,
but would award damages for breach of contract).
•66. See supra text accompanying note 28.
67. COLOMBET, supra note* 32, at 50. France has passed a new copyright law. Law No.
92-597 relative au code de la proprietd intellectuelle, 124 J.0. 8801 (July 3, 1992), amended
by Law No. 92-1336 relative A l'entrde en vigueur du nouveau code plnal, arts. 203--04, 124
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adopted the French model in many respects, 68 adopt a more limited right
to make changes or corrections. Moreover, some countries only require
the publisher to make such changes on publication of a new edition.69
The right of retraction, to fully cancel an assignment of rights to
publish, is the least recognized of the four moral rights. The method of
executing the right is seldom detailed in statutory law.70 In all countries
recognizing the right, the author must pay full compensation. Indeed, in
Spain, for example, if the author later decides to publish the work, she
must offer it to the original assignee on the original terms.7
The precise terms of the moral rights statutes are probably less
important than several other characteristics in determining the actual
efficacy of moral rights in any country. Widespread adherence to the
Berne Convention means that most countries have had to provide moral
rights protection to meet its minimum standard protecting the rights of
integrity and paternity. However, the existence of substantial industries
dependent in some measure on copyright and authorial originality, and
the existence of a legal system that provides effective (though not
necessarily speedy) protection are better indicators of the availability of
substantive remedies and the development of a significant jurisprudence
of moral rights than membership in the Berne Union.
Indeed, the cases examined in this article were the only major
non-European moral rights cases reported in Western topical journals.72
These cases come from two countries that draw their copyright laws
from the English model, but joined the Berne Union shortly after in-
dependence and provide statutory protection of the rights of paternity
and integrity. The Indian case comes out of the Indian film industry, a
substantial industry producing some 900 films each year;73 the Israeli
case comes from Biblical scholarship and archaeology, fields whose
significance in Israel cannot be doubted. It is the twin factors of an
effective legal system and substantial economic interests that motivated
J.0. 17568, 17583 (Dec. 23, 1992). For an English translation, see 29 COPYRIGHT at France-
Text 3-01 (July-Aug. 1993).
68. Patricia Rivera MacMurray, Moral Rights in Puerto Rico: Spanish Tradition and the
Federal System, 57 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 297, 300-304 (1988).
69. COLOMBET, supra note 32, at 50.
70. Id. at 51.
71. Id.
72. The cases were selected from reports in E.LP.R. and I.I.C., from commencement of
publication of E.J.P.R. and going back to 1979 for I.I.C.
73. Anita Ramasastry, Recent Development, Cinematic Sex and Censorship in Indian
Film, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 205 (1992).
[Vol. 16:545
Winter 1995] Authors' Moral Rights in Non-European Nations 555
these suits and imbued them with enough significance to make litigation
worthwhile.74
II. MORAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL.DOCUMENTS
A. The Berne Convention
Paragraph 1 of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention protects the rights
of paternity and integrity.75 Moral rights protection was introduced into
the Berne Convention in 1928, and was slightly amended in 1967.76 While
the rights are separate from and not transferred with the copyright, they
are not clearly inalienable.77 The rights of divulgation and withdrawal are
not included in Berne.
Under the second paragraph of article 6bis, moral rights must last at
least as long as the economic rights, but countries that did not provide
moral rights protection prior to acceding to the Convention are excepted
from this requirement. In those countries, protection need only last until
the author's death.78
74. Indeed, the court issued its decision in Mannu Bhandari after the parties had settled;
the opinion was released notwithstanding, as the parties, an author and a film production
company, recognized the need for precedent to guide behavior in this area of law. Mannu
Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd., 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) 13, 21 (1986).
75. The text of Article 6bis reads:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights,
and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation
of the country where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose
legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the
preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease
to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis, 7 COPYRIGHT at 137.
76. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 459-67 (1987). However, because of the bitter controversy over
the Protocol to Berne adopted at Stockholm in 1967, the Stockholm amendments never went
into effect. Id. at 124. The moral rights changes at Stockholm were incorporated at Paris in
1971. See id. at 631.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. At a 1990 meeting of the WIPO Committee
of Experts on model copyright law the European countries objected to the terms allowing
alienability, holding out instead for contractual "non-exercise clauses." Susan Wagner, WIPO
Committee of Experts Tackles Model Copyright Law, 4 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 215 (1990).
78. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis, para. 2, 7 COPYRIGHT at 137. For a
description of the various rules of duration, see supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
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The third paragraph of the article provides that enforcement of the
provision is to be through the national law "of the country where protec-
tion is claimed."'79 Thus, an American being sued for violation in Israel
of moral rights should be subject to Israeli law. An American being
sued in Israel for a violation of American copyright law should be
subject to American law.80
One hundred seven countries have joined Berne; twenty-five have
joined in the 1990s alone 8', Eighty-six of the countries signing the
Uruguay round final act are members of Berne.82 There are a number of
explanations for the recent rapid growth of the Berne Union. In the
aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly independent
states and former socialist nations have attempted to integrate rapidly
into the Western economic system.83 There also may be an increasing
belief among countries that had previously eschewed intellectual
property protection that such protection has come to be a requirement of
foreign investment, or at least a requisite for other gains from the
GATT.
B. TRIPS
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) is one of six major trade agreements of the GATT
Uruguay round. 84 TRIPS requires, inter alia, that GATT members give
protection to the intellectual property of other members that is
equivalent to that of the Berne Convention;85 the Paris Convention for
79. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis, para. 3, 7 COPYRIGHT at 137.
80. This is not necessarily the case, however. See infra Section III.C.3.a.
81. See supra note 12.
82. See the list of Uruguay Round signatories in GATT Uruguay Round, supra note 4,
H.R. Doc. No. 316 at 1324. For a list of Berne members, see Berne Members, supra note 12,
and accompanying additions listed in the same note.
83. Eight European formerly socialist states have joined Berne since 1990; a number of
others joined the Berne Union before World War II. Berne Members, supra note 12.
84. The major agreements of the Uruguay Round are: the Agreement on Trade in Goods,
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, TRIPS, the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
There are a number of more specialized agreements and Ministerial Declarations as well. See
GATT Uruguay Round, supra note 4. For a discussion of the provisions of TRIPS, see Ralph
Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'V U.S.A. 18
(1994) (discussing interaction of WIPO and GATT, and the provisions of TRIPS); J.H.
Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round. Competitive Prospects for
Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171 (1993) (describing draft TRIPS).
85. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
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the Protection of Industrial Property; 86 the Rome Convention, 7
governing performers, record producers, and broadcasters; and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.8"
Additionally, intellectual property must be granted most favored nation
treatment, subject to certain exceptions.89 Geographical indications,
identifying the origin of a good, must also be protected.'
Although compliance with the general substance of the Berne Con-
vention is mandatory under TRIPS,91 compliance with article 6bis was
specifically excepted,92 at the insistence of the U.S. delegation.93 The
agreement instead incorporates the United States' proposed language
verbatim.94
GATT members must guarantee that enforcement of rights guaran-
teed under TRIPS will be available to rights holders by "civil judicial
procedures. 95 Criminal penalties must be applicable for "wilful trade-
mark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.96
From the standpoint of moral rights, it is perhaps most important
that the GATT dispute resolution procedures apply to TRIPS. 97 The
86. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar.
20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967).
87. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, done Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
88. Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of hitegrated Circuits,
Feb. 12, 1987, 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989), 25 COPYRIGHT at Multilateral Treaties-Text-2-01 (June
1989) (not in force).
89. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1200.
90. Id. art. 22, 33 I.L.M. at 1205 (provides greater protection for indications of origin of
wine and spirits).
91. l art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
92. Id.
93. 2 TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GAT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(1986-1992) 2288-89 (1993).
94. Id. at 2289. In relevant part, the treaty states: "However, Members shall not have
rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of rights conferred under Article 6bis of
[the Berne] Convention or of the rights derived therefrom." TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 9, para.
1, 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
95. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 42, 33 I.L.M. at 1214.
96. Id., art. 61, 33 I.L.M. at 1220.
97. See id., art. 64, 33 I.L.M. at 1221 (making GATT dispute resolution procedures
applicable to TRIPS). GATT Uruguay Round, annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) sets forth the dispute
settlement procedure. For a general overview of dispute resolution under the World Trade Or-
ganization, see Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH J. INT'L L. 349 (1995). For an evaluation of dispute resolution
under TRIPS, see Bal Gopal Das, Intellectual Property Dispute, GATT WIPO: Of Playing by
the Game Rules and the Rules of the Game, 35 IDEA 149 (1994); Oman, supra note 85, at
27-28.
Michigan Journal of International Law
dispute resolution procedures provide a way to make the Berne Conven-
tion powerfully enforceable. The only formal dispute resolution method
provided in the Berne Convention is suit 'in the International Court of
Justice.98 This has never happened.99 Allowing enforcement of moral
rights through the GATT mechanism would thus create a risk that the
United States would be penalized for inadequate recognition of moral
rights."° The language excepting moral rights from TRIPS should fully
remove complaints of both over-enforcement and under-enforcement of
moral rights from TRIPS.
Members are to implement TRIPS within one year of accession.'
The exceptions for developing countries, countries converting to a free
market economy, and least-developed countries apply to the implementa-
tion of Berne standards.' °2 A number of U.S. groups have complained
that the delay in implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements by
lesser developed countries is unfair to the U.S.' °3
Having examined the international framework of moral rights pro-
tection, this note will next turn to examples of the enforcement of moral
rights within the national protections of non-European nations.
III. MORAL RIGHTS IN NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: Two CASES
This section will discuss in detail two cases from non-European
nations. The first, Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd.' 4 is
98. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 33, 7 COPYRIGHT at 145.
99. Paul E. Geller, Can the GATT Incorporate Berne Whole?, 4 WORLD INTELL. PROP.
REP. 193, 194 (1990).
100. During the debate on inclusion of Berne in TRIPS, Professor Geller pointed out the
conflict over inclusion of moral rights in TRIPS. Id. If TRIPS included moral rights, countries
that did not provide moral rights would be subject to complaints of violation of the GATT for
distortion or obstruction of trade. Id. at 195-96. If moral rights were not included, those
countries that vigorously enforce moral rights would risk complaints that their policy obstruct-
ed trade, for example by preventing the broadcast of a foreign film with commercial interrup-
tions. Id. at 196.
101. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 65, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
102. Id. art. 65, paras. 2-3, art. 66, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1222. Developing and least-
developed countries must provide national treatment within one year, but need n3t comply
with the requirements of the Berne Convention and other conventions for five and eleven
years, respectively. Id.
103. GAT: The Impact on American Industries, 1994: Hearing and Markup on H. Res.
362 before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1994), microformed on CIS No. 94-H381-86
(Congressional Info. Serv.). For a general discussion of the conflicts between Western
industrialized countries on the one hand, and newly-industrialized countries and lesser-
developed countries on the other, see Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay
Round - Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH J. INT'L L.
1317 (1990).
104. Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd., 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) 13 (1986).
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an Indian High Court (Appellate Court) decision, finding that the makers
of a poor film adaptation of a prominent Indian author's novel were
liable for violation of the author's right of integrity. The second, Qimron
v. Shanks, 5 is an Israeli trial court decision, finding. violation of the
rights of integrity and attribution by publication by the American defen-
dants, in America, of the plaintiffs reconstruction of the text of one of
the Dead Sea Scrolls. Both of these cases show a vigorous moral rights
jurisprudence, and illustrate the potential effect of moral rights enforce-
ment on American authors and publishers.
A. Indian & Israeli Moral Rights Law
India and Israel derive their copyright law from British copyright
law. India, while a territory under British administration, adopted its first
copyright law in 1847,106 although the British Copyright Act of 1842
apparently applied to Indian territory. The British government of India
adopted a succeeding act in 1914,'07 incorporating the British copyright
Act of 1911 with some modifications."08 India joined the Berne Conven-
tion in 1958.I0 In 1957, India adopted a new copyright law to comply
with the requirements of Berne and the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion.1  The moral rights provisions were introduced at this time.'
105. Qimron v. Shanks, 3 [5753-1993] P.M. 10 (D. Jerusalem 1993); see supra note 14.
106. S. Ramaiah, India, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE at IND-1,
IND-13 (Paul E. Geller ed., Oct. 1994).
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id at IND-46.
110. See id at IND-14.
111. India's moral rights provision states:
57. Author's special rights. - (1) Independently of the author's copyright, and
even after the assignment either wholly or partially of the said copyright, the author
of a work shall have the right to claim the authorship of the work as well as the
right to restrain, or claim damages in respect of -
(a) any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work; or
(b) any other action in relation to the said work which would be prejudicial to
his honour or reputation.
(2) The right conferred upon an author of a work by sub-section (1), other than the
right to claim authorship of the work, may be exercised by the legal representatives
of the author.
The Copyright Act, 1957, ch. 12, § 57, 15 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 168, 234 (5th ed. 1989).
Although the copyright law has since been amended, the moral rights provision has not
changed. See The Copyright (Amendment) Ordinance, 1991, reprinted in India Text 1-01, 28
COPYRIGHT, at India Text 1-01 (Apr. 1992) (extending term of copyright protection to sixty
years after death of author or publication of anonymous or pseudonymous work). The law
was amended in May 1994 to provide stronger protection for computer software. See Rahul
Sharma, INDIA'S NEW COPYRIGHT LAWS TO BOOST SOFTWARE FIRMS, REUTER ASIA-PAC.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Recent revision of the Indian copyright law strengthened protection of
computer software.' I2
Israel's copyright law is also based on British law. The British
Copyright Act of 1911 was applied to Palestine in 1924, along with
Mandatory legislation. 113 Israel joined Berne in 1950. The most 1981
revision of the copyright law introduced protection for the rights of
integrity and paternity." 4 Israel has rapidly developed a substantial
jurisprudence of moral rights. 15
B. Mannu Bhandari: Protection of the Author from Film Makers
1. The Case
Mannu Bhandari is a distinguished author of novels in Hindi. Her
work is concerned with reconciling the modern with the trimillenial
Bus. REP., May 31, 1994 available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuapb File. For a critique of
§ 57, see Krishnaswami Ponnuswami, Intellectual Property, 23 ANN. SURVEY OF INDIAN L.
371, 372-74 (1987). The integrity language of § 57 is broader than art. 6bis as it links the
requirement that the changes be prejudicial to the honor or reputation of the author to "other
changes" only, broadening the effect of the "distortion" language. Id. at 377.
112. Ramaiah, supra note 106, at IND-10 to IND-13.
113. Joshua Weisman, Israel, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 110, at ISR-1, ISR-3.
114. Mayer Gabay, Israel Adopts Moral Rights Law, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 462
(1982). The law states:
4A.(1) The author shall have the right to have his name applied to the work in the
accepted manner and to the accepted extent.
(2) The author has the right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modifi-
cation of the work or to any other derogatory action in relation thereto which may
be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
(3) The violation of a right under this section is a civil wrong, and the provisions
of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version) shall apply thereto.
(4) The right of the author under this section shall be independent of his economic
right in the work and shall be available to the him even after such right has been
transferred to another, wholly or in part.
(5) In an action under this section, the author shall be entitled to compensation in
an amount determined by the court in accordance with the circumstances of the
case, even if no pecuniary damage has been proved. This provision shall not
derogate from any other power of the court under Chapter Five of the Civil
Wrongs Ordinance (New Version).
Copyright Ordinance (Amendment No. 4) Law, 5741-1981, § 3, 35 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 368 (May 20, 1981) (Isr.) (authorized translation from the Hebrew prepared at the
Ministry of Justice). The copyright amendment in 1988 introduced protection of software and
extended the prison terms and increased the fine for criminal copyright infringement. Copy-
right Ordinance (Amendment No. 5) Law 5748-1988 (Isr.), translation reprinted in 25
COPYRIGHT, Israel-Text 1-01, at 1 (Mar. 1989). For a discussion of the status of moral rights
in Israel prior to adoption of article 4A, see Michael Ophir, The Protection of Authors' Moral
Rights in Israel, 12 COPYRIGHT 209 (1976).
115. See Weisman, supra note 113, at ISR-19 to ISR-20 (citing cases).
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Hindu tradition."16 Kala Vikas Pictures, a motion picture production
company, bought the rights, except the publication right, to her novel
Aap Ka Bunty"7 for 15,001 rupees." 8 Ms. Bhandari agreed to permit the
director and screenwriter, Shri Sirsir Mishra, to make "certain modifica-
tions in [her] novel for the film version, in discussion with [her] to
make it suitable for a successful film.""19 The contract further specified
that Ms. Bhandari would receive credit as author of the novel on which
the movie was based. 20
Sadly, all did not go well in this artistic endeavor. Ms. Bhandari
became concerned by the extent of the changes made for the film,
including the name of the film, characterization, "vulgar" dialogue, and
the ending of the film. 12' After finding the director unresponsive to her
complaints, 22 Ms. Bhandari sued for infringement of her moral rights in
the novel, specifically for violation of her right of integrity; that the
filmmakers had "mutilated and distorted" the novel. 23
The district court in Delhi denied Ms. Bhandari an "ad-interim
restraint order," holding that she had not shown prima facie mutilation
or distortion, because she had authorized the producers "to make neces-
sary changes in order to make a successful film."'24 In an odd holding,
the district judge stated:
In my view, prima facie the film is not at all going to harm the
reputation of the plaintiff in any manner. The plaintiffs reputation
can be harmed in the eyes of those only who have read her novel
and seen the film also. Those who have read her novel and seen
the film may change their views about the producer, director of the
film but not about the plaintiff."' 25
116. Elizabeth Bumiller, Letter from India: A Literary Who's Who of the Subcontinent,
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1986, (Book World), at 15. The court detailed her accomplishments.
Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd., 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) 13, 18 (1986).
117. "Your Bunty"; Bunty is the name of the protagonist. The work has been translated
into English. MANNu BHANDARI, BUNTY (Jai Ratan trans., 1983).
118. 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) at 15. Fifteen thousand rupees would have been worth ap-
proximately $1,500. Foreign Exchange, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 22, 1983, at D5. The rights
transferred included, inter alia, radio, television, "[v]ideo," and "(tjapes." 1987 A.I.R. (Del.)
at 15.
119. 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 19-20.
122. Id. at 17-18.
123. Id at 14.
124. Id.
125. Id
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The trial judge thus suggested that a bad film reflects poorly only on the
filmmakers, not on the author of the adapted work. It is more likely,
however, that those who know the author's work only through its film
adaptation are unlikely to distinguish carefully between the film repre-
sentation of the work and the work itself.' 26 The lower court also found
laches on Ms. Bhandari's part, arguing that she had waited until after
the film had been completed to complain.
127
On appeal, the High Court in Delhi modified the district court's
denial of relief, directing that a number of changes be made to the film
before release. The parties settled the case immediately before the High
Court handed down its opinion. The filmmakers agreed to withdraw Ms.
Bhandari's name and the name of her novel from the movie 28 and all
attendant publicity, and released the copyright to her. 29 In return, Ms.
Bhandari agreed not to "claim any right or interest" in the movie, and
not to contest in any way the release of the movie (so long as neither
her name nor the title of her novel were used). 30 The parties requested
that judgment be pronounced notwithstanding the settlement and at-
tendant dismissal of appeal, citing the complete lack of precedent in the
area as the rationale.' 3' The High Court did so with apparent glee.
2. The High Court Decision
The High Court cannot be accused of understating the breadth or
significance of the questions on appeal:
How far law protects creative aesthetic expression of an artist?
Is the intellectual property of an artist governed by the same norms
as commercial property? Where does the freedom (of expression)
of the author end, where does the director [sic] begin? What is the
scope and width of S. 57 of the Copyright Act, 1957?132
The court's resolution of the issues is quite thorough. The decision
covers three important concerns: whether an assignment of copyright
also transfers the moral right and the interpretation of the copyright
126. The appellate court took this view. See id. at 18.
127. Id. at 17-18.
128. The movie was titled Samay Ki Dhara ("The Flow of Time"); the title of the novel
had apparently never been the title of the movie, and Ms. Bhandari had apparently opposed
the movie's title. Id. at 19.
129. Id. at 20 (stating the terms of the settlement).
130. Id.
131. Id. The settlement, of course, renders the decision ineffective. Ponnuswami, supra
note 111, at 374.
132. 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) at 13.
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assignment in light of the moral right; what constitutes a "distortion,
mutilation or other modification[]" of the work; 33 and what constitutes
an "action ... which would be prejudicial to [the author's] honour or
reputation. ' 34
a. Moral Right and Contract
The Indian copyright law makes the moral rights of paternity and
integrity independent of the author's copyright, and provides that assign-
ment of copyright does not assign the moral rights; the author may
obtain injunctive relief or damages for infringement of moral rights. 35
The court stated that the moral rights provision overrode the terms of
Bhandari's contract, that the contract could not negate the law's rights
and remedies, and that "[t]he assignee of a copyright cannot claim any
rights or immunities based on the contract which are inconsistent" with
the law.136 Taken literally, a filmmaker could never make a derivative
work from a novel, for some modification, as broadly defined by the
court, would be inevitable. The court, however, does not appear to take
its statement quite so literally.
The court found that Bhandari's contract provided that she had
agreed "to allow [the director/screenwriter] to make certain modifica-
tions in [her] novel for the film version in discussion with [her] to make
it suitable for a successful film.' ' 137 The court insisted that this language
be read to compliment 38 the moral rights provisions. 39 The court defines
the modifications permissible under the contract to include only those
permissible under section 57.14° The court finds it "obvious" that, under
law and contract, the filmmakers had the right to make only the certain
necessary modifications, and only upon consultation. 4'
Unfortunately, this answer is not obvious at all; the law says nothing
about necessity as a justification for changes. If the law overrides the
terms of the contract, then Ms. Bhandari's consent to certain changes
should not save Kala Vikas. The court ultimately solved the problem
through its definition of "modifications."
133. Copyright Act of 1957 § 57(a), 15 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 234.
134. Id. § 57(b). The court also discusses the laches issue.
135. Id. § 57.
136. 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) at 16.
137. Id.
138. The court's term. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
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b. Distortion, Mutilation, and Modification
The court at first took an expansive view of the term modification,
stating that:
The words "other modification" appearing in the sub-cl. (a) will
have to be read ejusdem generis with the words "distortion" and
mutilation". The modification should not be so serious that the
modified form of the work looks quite different from the original
work. "Modification" in the sense of the perversion of the original,
may amount to distortion or mutilation. But, there can be a modifi-
cation simplicitor such as where "A" is changed to "B", both being
quite distinct. Sub-clause (a) thus provides inviolability to an intel-
lectual work. 142
That is, any modification could be a violation of the author's moral
right; the work is "inviolable" even as to apparently minor changes that
are nonetheless "distinct." Taken literally, this would present a substan-
tial problem for makers of motion pictures or other derivative works, as
it appears to provide no protection for interpretive changes in making
the film. If moral rights are entirely inalienable, no maker of a deriva-
tive work that modifies the original can be protected from an author's
claim of moral rights infringement.
Near the end of the opinion, the court finds the necessary middle
ground. In discussing the use of "brash sex" in the movie, the court
stated that it did not'sit as a censor or to impose its. views on sex; its
only concern was whether the derivative work is authentic and "what
changes are necessary due to constraints of a medium."'43 The court
appears to have made moral rights inalienable, while placing outside the
prohibition on modifications such changes as are necessary to make the
transition to a different medium. This standard seems very protective of
the author; however, the court's resolution of specific fact issues in the
picture is inconsistent at best.14
142. 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) at 16. This reading is required by the law's deviation from the
Berne moral requirements. See supra note 111.
143. Id. at 19. The blanket prohibition on distortion, discussed supra note 111, leaves a
void in the arena of adaptations and necessitates some inference; the court's resolution is, at
least theoretically, a sensible one.
144. For example, the court allowed substantial changes to the end of the film, where the
director has Bunty die rather than simply leave home. Id. at 19-20. However, the court
ordered the removal of the "crude, brash and nauseating" morgue scene, where Bunty's
parents search for his body. Id. at 20. It does not seem that the change to the ending meets
the strict standard of necessity any more than the morgue scene, and it may be that the
judge's order was based instead on considerations of taste. The court directed that certain
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c. The Honor Or Reputation of the Author
The court found a close relationship between the right of integrity
and the right of paternity in this case. The reason for not allowing
modifications that distort or mutilate was that Ms. Bhandari was to
receive authorial credit for the movie. The court found that the term
"credit," as a term of art in show business, means recognition of the
work of those who have made credit-worthy contributions to making the
work a box-office success.' 45 Box office success, however, does not
imply that the work done will be a credit to the author's reputation. The
court then interprets the contract term "'proper' publicity" as that which
does not harm the author's honor and reputation.' 46 The author, then,
was promised that her reputation would at least not be harmed by the
film.
The court takes into account the unique conditions of the Indian
film business bearing upon the damage to the author's reputation. As the
court explains, colorfully:
It is widely believed that there are investments and collections of
crores of rupees in a successful Hindi movie and the heroes and
heroines are paid fabulous amounts for their services. If the com-
plaint of the author (of mutilation and distortion of the novel) is
correct the lay public and her admirers are likely to conclude that
she has fallen prey to big money in the film world and has con-
sented to such mutilation and distortions. The apprehension of the
author cannot be dismissed as imaginary. It is reasonable. Her
admirers are likely to doubt her sincerity and commitment and she
is likely to be placed in the category of cheap screenplay writers of
the common run Bombay Hindi films. 147
suggestive dialogue be deleted, id. at 19, although certain changes to character were
permitted, not because they were directly suggested by the novel, but rather because there
were other, equally suggestive situations, that the director did not include, id. Finally, the
court found that the movie title, The Flow of Time, was insufficiently specific, and ordered
that the title include both The Flow of Time and Your Bunty. Id. For a discussion of whether
a change in title can be a distortion or mutilation, see Ponnuswami, supra note 11l, at 377.
145. 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) at 16-17.
146. Id. at 17.
147. 1d. at 18. A crore is ten million, applied specifically to rupees. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 540 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986). At the 1983 rate of
exchange, ten million rupees would be worth approximately one million dollars. Foreign
Exchange, supra note 118. Hindi films follow a highly standardized format:
Indian films have a special structure, essentially composed of a pastiche of genres
mixed into a three-hour song-and-dance extravaganza, somewhat reminiscent of the
Hollywood musical of the 1940s and intended for the whole family. For over forty
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The author should be protected from appearing to have sold out in the
production of a poor or even average quality film for its genre. The
law's concerns about an author's honor and reputation are thus applied
subjectively to the medium under consideration; one is forced to wonder
if the court would have been so solicitous of the author's reputation had
this been a Merchant-Ivory production.
C. Qimron v. Shanks: An Expansive View
of a Scholar's Moral Rights
It seems likely that a publisher's worst nightmare would be to be
hauled into a foreign court, sued for violation of his own country's
copyright law, and have the far less favorable (for him) copyright law of
the foreign country applied as if it were the law of his own country. The
final end of such a nightmare, of course, would be an award of damages
on a scale unprecedented in the foreign country. This nightmare came
true for Hershel Shanks, the director of the Biblical Archaeology Society
and publisher and writer of the foreword of a volume of photographs of
the Dead Sea Scrolls.
1. The Controversy over the Scrolls
The Dead Sea Scrolls are a large collection of scrolls and scroll
fragments dating from roughly 250 B.C. to A.D. 7014 The scrolls are
believed to shed light on the Judaism of the time, on the nature of some
of the various Jewish sects, and the origins of Christianity.
The largest part of the scrolls were originally in Jordanian posses-
sion.149 There were no Jewish scholars on the original team. 0 When the
Israeli government took possession of the scrolls during the Six Day
War in 1967, it continued the research project.' The small group of
years, Hindi-language movies have contained the same strange combination of
"plastic," dream-like plots.
Ramasastry, supra note 73, at 206. In the last twenty-five years, stylized rape scenes have
become increasingly common in Hindi films. Id. at 207.
148. Frank M. Cross, The Historical Content of the Scrolls, in UNDERSTANDING THE
DEAD SEA SCROLLS 20, 23-24 (Hershel Shanks ed., 1992). Professor Carson ably explains the
history of the Dead Sea Scrolls controversy in this issue of the Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law. Cindy A. Carson, Raiders of the Lost Scrolls: The Right of Scholarly Access to
the Content of Historic Documents, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 299, 301-307 (1995).
149. The Scrolls were originally under the control of the Department of Antiquities for
Transjordan and Arab Palestine and the ,cole Biblique et Archdologique Franqaise. Carson,
supra note 148, at 302. Jordan nationalized the Scrolls in 1961, id. at 303.
150. Id. at 304.
151. Id.
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scholars assigned to research the scrolls has proceeded with frustrating
deliberation. 5 2 Until very recently, scholars not a part of this group had
no access to a large part of the Scroll collection. 53 A number of
scholars have sought release of Scroll texts for some time; a center of
this dissent has been Mr. Shanks' Biblical Archaeology Review, a
bimonthly publication that has long advocated greater access to the
Scrolls. In 1991, the Huntington Library in Long Beach California made
archival photographs of the scrolls in its possession available to schol-
ars."5 In late 1991, the Biblical Archaeology Society published a collec-
tion of photographic plates of the Dead Sea Scrolls; the source of the
photographs reproduced in the volumes was not disclosed. 55 The work
was edited by Professors Robert H. Eisenman and James M. Robinson.
Mr. Shanks wrote the now-infamous foreword.
In the foreword, Shanks railed against the international team's
withholding scroll texts, and included a reconstruction of one scroll text,
the Miqsat Ma'aseh Torah (M.M.T.) done by Professor John Strugnell15 6
of Harvard and Professor Elisha Qimron of Ben-Gurion University in
Beersheva, Israel.'57 Prof. Qimron is an expert on Jewish traditional
doctrine (Halacha); Strugnell brought him onto the research team for
this reason.'58 In relevant part, the forward read:
The effort to prevent disclosure of the important text known as
MMT (miqsat ma'aseh ha-torah) is illustrative. The text was as-
signed to John Strugnell for publication nearly 40 years ago. How-
ever, he did not even disclose its existence until 1984. Then, with
a colleague, Strugnell proceeded to write a 500-page commentary
on this 120-line text.
159
152. See Leading Dead Sea Scroll Scholar Denounces Delay, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 22; Carson, supra note 148, at 304.
153. Carson, supra note 148, at 304.
154. Id. at 306. The decision was contested, unsuccessfully, by the Israel Antiquities
Authority. Id.
155. The editors stated that the source was unknown, but was not the Huntington or the
Ancient Biblical Manuscript Center in Claremont, California. The Dead Sea Scrolls Are Now
Available to All!, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 63. The work at issue is
A FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS (Robert H. Eisenman & James M. Robin-
son, eds., 1991).
156. See MMT as the Maltese Falcon, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994,
at 49 (describing history of work on MMT).
157. Qimron v. Shanks, 3 [5753-1993] P.M. 10, 15, trans. at 1-2 (D. Jerusalem 1993).
158. Carson, supra note 148, at 307.
159. Qimron v. Shanks, trans. at 6 (quotation not in official report) (emphasis added).
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Professor Qimron, of course, is the "colleague" mentioned in the text.
An appendix to the foreword included the reconstructed text. 160
2. The Case
Professor Qimron lost little time in seeking redress. On January 14,
1992, he sued in the District Court of Jerusalem, seeking damages of
NIS 472,500 (approximately $250,000)161 and an injunction against
distribution of the book.' 62 The court issued the injunction ex parte one
week later. 63
The matter was tried on February 1 and 2, 1993,16 in the District
Court of Jerusalem, before Judge Dalia Dorner1 65 with additional oral
argument on February 25.'66 The court ruled emphatically for the plain-
tiff, awarding statutory damages of NIS 20,000 ($7,407), damages of
NIS 80,00 ($29,630) for mental distress, and attorneys' fees of NIS
50,000 ($18,519).67 This was the largest amount ever awarded for
mental distress and costs in a copyright case in an Israeli court.' 68 The
defendants have appealed the decision to the Israeli Supreme Court; that
appeal is still pending.169
160. Id. at 7.
161. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 19, trans. at 9. "NIS" stands for New Israeli Shekel.
162. ld For dollar amounts, see Qimron is Author of MMT Reconstruction, Jerusalem
Court Holds, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV., May-June 1993, at 69 [hereinafter MMT
Reconstruction].
163. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 19, trans. at 9.
164. Hershel Shanks, Lawsuit Diary, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV., May-June 1993, at
69, 70. Shanks noted that the trial was squeezed into two days by working with only a brief
dinner break over approximately twelve hours each day. Id. at 70-71.
165. Judge Dorner has since been elevated to the Israeli Supreme Court. Supreme Court
Gets 2 New Justices, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 14, 1994, at 2 (Justice Domer permanently
appointed to Supreme Court); Batsheva Tsur, Herzog: Judiciary Must Be Wary of Excessive
Use of Powers, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jpost
File (not available on microform) (Judge Domer appointed for limited term). The Qimron
decision was handed down on March 30, 1993.
166. Shanks, supra note 164, at 71.
167. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 39-41, trans. at 42, 44-45. For dollar equivalents, see MMT
Reconstruction, supra note 162, at 69.
168. Abraham Rabinovich, Court Awards Dead Sea Scrolls Translator NIS 100,000,
JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jpost File (not available
on microform).
169. The Notice of Appeal notes some 73 disputed issues, including, inter alia, improper
choice of law and improper application of moral rights law. Appellants Notice of Appeal,
Qimron v. Shanks (Isr. filed Nov. 28, 1993) (in Hebrew) (copy on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law). The defendants decided to appeal in part because other
lawsuits related to MMT and the scrolls are pending. BAR Decides to Appeal Qimron
Decision, After All, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 66.
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The court found that the reconstruction was copyrightable, t70 that
Professor Qimron owned the copyright in the MMT reconstruction,"'1
that publication of the reconstruction willfully infringed the copyright, 72
and that publication without using Qimron's name was a violation of his
moral right. 73 The application of copyright to a reconstructed ancient
text is very controversial; if the reconstruction is correct, it is merely the
restoration of the author's original words without the addition of any
new quantum of creativity to the work.' 74
3. The Court's Decision
There are three areas of particular relevance to this note in the
decision. First is the court's decision to apply Israeli law as the equiva-
lent of American law. This is at least ironic if not problematic; although
the Israeli standards for copyrightability appear to be the same as Amer-
ican law,175 there is a significant disparity in protection of moral rights.
The Israeli court steadfastly refused to believe that protection of moral
rights might not be comparable t76 The second issue of importance is the
application of moral rights to the specific issues in the case. The third is
the calculation of damages for infringement of moral rights.
170. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 24, trans. at 17.
171. Id. at 25-26, trans. at 18-21. Unfortunately, the court never states clearly whether
Prof. Strugnell also had part of the copyright; it is not clear whether the court considers the
reconstruction a "common work," where each author holds the copyright, or a "collective
work consisting of discrete parts," in which "each author is entitled to copyright on his part
only. Id. at 25, trans. at 18. However, it seems most likely that the court found that only
Qimron held the copyright. The resolution of this issue is important in considering the right of
paternity; see infra text accompanying notes 210-12.
172. Id at 40, trans. at 43.
173. Id. at 33, trans. at 31. The court did not find infringement of moral rights by
publication of only 120 lines of the 132-line text. See Carson, supra note 148, at 330, for
reasons why the incomplete reproduction here would not infringe the moral right.
174. The court applied the reasoning of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), and found that the reconstruction was an original work, as it
"included creative and original elements" in piecing together scroll fragments and using
research in and knowledge of Hebrew and Halacha. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 22, trans. at 14.
For a discussion of the availability of copyright for reconstructions of historic documents, see
Carson, supra note 148, at 323-41.
175. As noted, the court based its reasoning on Feist, and other American cases, and
Nimmer on Copyright. Id. at 22, trans. at 15. One American commentator on the work
suggests that the Israeli standard for originality is not the same as the American. Lisa M.
Weinstein, Comment, Ancient Works, Modern Dilemmas: The Dead Sea Scrolls Copyright
Case, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 1637, 1649-51 (1994). Given the Israeli court's clear acceptance of
the Feist standard for originality in compilations, this seems insupportable.
176. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 22, trans. at 14.
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a. Choice of Law
Qimron presents an unusual set of circumstances for choice of law.
Professor Qimron did not seek protection in Israel for infringement in
Israel of his rights in an American work. Nor did he seek relief in the
United States for infringement of an Israeli work in the United States.
These would presumably require typical and straightforward applications
of the national treatment provisions of the national law of Israel and the
United States. In the unusual posture of the case, Qimron sought redress
for infringement of what was probably an Israeli work in the United
States by Americans occurring in the United States - but he sought the
relief in Israeli court. 77 The Israeli court applied local rules, both as to
the substantive issues of choice of law, 178 and to procedural issues such
as proof of foreign law.
179
In its discussion of choice of law and proof of foreign law, the court
notes that Israeli copyright law derives from English copyright law and
the requirements of the Berne Convention.'80 The court then states that
the law of the place of infringement applies; here, that would be the
United States.' Under "the presumption of equal laws," however,
Israeli law would be applied unless foreign law were proved by the
defendants. 2
The presumption of equal laws in England states that, subject to
limited exceptions (Scottish law, EU law, Irish law), and in the absence
of proof in the form of expert testimony to the contrary, the court will
assume that foreign law is the same as English law.'83
177. For a discussion of the application of lex loci protectionis and lex fori, see Gydrgy
Boytha, Some Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Authors' Rights, 24
COPYRIGHT 399, 409-10 (1988) (validity of copyright determined in country where infringing
act takes place, not that of the forum).
178. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 21, trans. at 12 ("Everybody agrees that the laws of the place
where [a copyright] infringement has been committed apply to the [pertinent] action, i.e., in
this case, the laws of the United States." (citations omitted, alterations in original)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 21-22, trans. at 13.
181. Id. at 21, trans. at 12.
182. Id. Compare this approach with FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (allowing court discretion in
questions of judicial notice and proof of foreign law). See generally Larry Kramer, Interest
Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (1989) (dispu-
ting need for presumption of forum law in choice of law).
183. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 436 (Jack I. H. Jacob, ed. 1988), see also
1 DICEY AND MORIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 226-38 (Lawrence Collins, ed., 12th ed.
1993); P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
107-12 (12th ed. 1992). As described by the court, the Israeli version of the principle is
slightly different, as it includes exceptions for personal status that are not encompassed by the
English version. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 21, trans. at 12.
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The defendants argued that, since copyright is grounded in a proper-
ty right, the presumption as understood in Israel should not apply.
184
Copyright is a property right created by national legislation, and rights
thus vary from place to place; fair determination of the rights of the
parties requires application of the law where the right is contested rather
than the possibly differing law of some other place. The court rejected
this argument. Although the court conceded that "copyright is a propri-
etary issue," Israeli Supreme Court precedent had applied the. presump-
tion of equal laws to proprietary rights. 8 5 Further, according to the
court, in Israeli law, a claim for copyright infringement sounds in tort.
186
The problem in this case is that the existence of copyright is the root
issue in the case and the existence of moral rights an important corol-
lary."8 7 Both of these should be treated as property rights.
188
The court then states an additional rationale for application of the
presumption:
At any rate, the presumption of equal laws is not fictitious at all in
our matter. As aforesaid, the English law - on which American
law is also based - has been adopted in Israel. On a particular
matter (statutory damages), procedure in Israel follows in the steps
184. The court's statement of the issue is worth reproducing:
The presumption of equal laws, which is recognized by international private
law, is based on the presumption that the laws of enlightened countries are identi-
cal. This presumption does not apply to all branches of law. Thus, judicial inter-
pretation tends to maintain that, in light of the special characteristics of Israeli
personal status laws, the presumption of equal laws should not be relied upon on
personal status matters. Defendants tried to rely upon a text proposed by Professor
Levontin, namely, that on local issues (status and property) grounded on a par-
ticular jurisprudence, the claimant should prove the foreign law, while on transitory
actions (contracts and torts), there should be no deviation from the laws of the
venue, except if the counterpart pleads a defense based on the foreign law. Accord-
ing to Defendants, the action against them is a proprietary one, and therefore
Claimant should have proven the foreign law.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Menashe Shava, Proof of Foreign Law in Israel: A Compara-
tive Study, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 211 (1984). Shava criticizes the requirement of
proof of foreign law in cases involving status and property, id. at 233, but states that Israeli
courts require proof of foreign law even as to status, id. at 226. In general, however, the
burden of proof of foreign law should fall on the party pleading it. Id. at 225. It is an open
question in Qimron as to who needs to plead foreign law - Professor Qimron, who is
seeking to recover under United States law and should have to prove that U.S. law permits
recovery, or Shanks, who is pleading defenses based on U.S. law and its nonrecognition of
moral rights.
185. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 21, trans. at 12-13.
186. Id. at 21, trans. at 13.
187. See id. at 22-24, trans. at 14-17 (discussing existence of copyright in the recon-
structed text).
188. For choice of law in moral rights, see infra text accompanying notes 195-202.
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of the procedure of the American Law. The entire legislation has
been adapted to an international treaty.189
As to copyright generally, this statement is essentially correct. The
Israeli court uses the Feist"g criteria and rationale as the basis for its
discussion of the existence of copyright. In the end, in deciding on the
existence of a copyright, the Israeli court analyzes and applies United
States law as the Israeli law that it is applying as if it were United
States law. Thus the court, in the end and by an unnecessarily meander-
ing course, applies the appropriate law."9
The court incorrectly assumes that the moral rights laws of Israel
and the United States are actually equivalent and that U.S. moral rights
law conforms to Berne, however. The Berne Convention requires that
the United States protect moral rights. However, the treaty is not regard-
ed as self-executing by the United States. 192 Thus moral rights would
have to be enacted by Congressional lawmaking; this was done to a
limited extent in the VARA. Failure to protect moral rights sufficiently
would place the United States in breach of its obligations under the
Berne Convention. Accession to the Convention does not, in and of
itself, protect individual authors. 193 The assumption that United States
and Israeli moral rights law are equivalent is, without more evidence,
unfounded.
The court, in deciding on application of the presumption of equal
laws, stated that the presumption of equal laws should apply even under
the defendants' proposed approach,' 94 which would limit application the
presumption to transitory issues (i.e. tort and contract) but not to
property issues. 195 The defendants' approach, however, does not address
189. 1d. at 21-22, trans. at 13.
190. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
191. The soundness of the decision, however, is open to question. See Carson, supra
note 148, at 324-335 (evaluating the copyrightability of the Dead Sea Scrolls text).
192. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988).
193. WILHELM NORDEMANN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS LAW 16 (Dr. Gerald Meyer, Eng. ed., R. Livingston, trans., 1990).
194. See supra note 186.
195. In reply to the defendants' argument, the court stated that:
At any rate, the main point is that, even according to Professor Levontin's
method, the presumption of equal laws applies to the matter before me.
First, even though copyright is a proprietary issue, a claim for copyright
infringement is by nature tortious. The Torts Ordinance supplements the special
copyright provisions established by the Copyright Law.
Second, the test proposed by Professor Levontin is not based on a mechanical
classification of law by branches. The determinant factor is whether a local,
particular law of the venue is involved or not. Property and status laws have been
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the question whether moral rights are property rights or transitory rights.
One commentator notes that, at least in the civil law, moral rights are
classified as a right of personality (and thus transitory rights), unlike
copyright, which is a property right. 196 In this view, violation of the
moral right would seem more like a tort, and the presumption as defined
by the court thus applicable. However, to the extent that Berne applies
its national treatment requirement to both moral rights and economic
rights, it would seem that moral rights should be seen as functionally as
property. 97 Moral rights are created under the national law of the pro-
tecting country; the extent of the rights and their duration varies.' 9'
An alternative rationale to the court's presumption of equal laws is
the reasoning of the French Cour de Cassation in the Huston case. In
Huston, the court found that application of American law, which makes
the producer of a film the author for copyright purposes, would be an
affront to the "laws of immediate application" of France. 99 After Hus-
ton, "the 'author' of a foreign work is the person French law would
deem the author, whatever her status at home."'  While the wisdom and
propriety of the decision is debatable, 2°' its rationale is direct.2°2
mentioned as par excellence locality examples. Israeli copyright laws are not local,
and similar laws are accepted everywhere in the enlightened world.
3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 21, trans. at 13 (citation omitted). The court attempted to show that the
defense could not meet the requirements of its own argument without actually adopting the
argument. However, the court's acceptance of the idea that copyright is a proprietary issue is
problematic, as there can be no infringement if there is no copyright. The court should have
addressed the substance of Levontin's argument, but did not.
196. Merryman, supra note 1, at 1025 & n.5 (noting that a minority of'states treat moral
rights as property rights).
197. Compare Berne Convention arts. 5(3) and 6bis(3); the language requires application
of the law of the country where protection is claimed in either circumstance. Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 2, 7 COPYRIGHT at 136, 137. See generally Georges Koumantos, Private Law
and the Berne Convention, 24 COPYRIGHT 415, 427 (1988) (discussing views of moral rights
as personal or property). The decision of the French Cour de Cassation in the Huston case
represents a triumph of the personality right conception; the author's moral right, however it
may be defined outside France, will always be judged by French law when in France. See
Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 21, at 141.
198. National protection makes sense so long as the place of infringement is carefully
defined; it has to be where the infringing work is created or the destructive act takes place. If,
for example, a colorized film is taken from the place where it was legally made to a jurisdic-
tion where colorization is an infringement, the law of the second jurisdiction should not
apply.
199. Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 21, at 139-40.
200. Id. at 141.
201. Id. at 141-42.
202. An exception of the same sort is available in English law. See NORTH & FAWCETT,
supra note 183, at 128 (arguing that the public policy exception to recognition of foreign law
should be narrowly construed). It might be hard for the Israeli court to justify such a drastic
measure when the ordinance creating the right at issue is only seven years old. Of course, the
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In what Judge Dorner apparently saw as a last-ditch effort to avoid
application of Israeli moral rights law, the defendants presented authori-
ties stating that "no droit moral applies according to the laws of the
United States (except for six states)." 3 The court found this immaterial,
noting first, that foreign law would have to be proven by expert
testimony, and second, by stating that it was not conclusively shown
that Washington, D.C.' does not provide explicit moral rights protec-
tion.2 5
The court thus manages to assume, for failure by the defendants to
prove otherwise to its satisfaction, a proposition that has been the sub-
ject of a large number of differing views since the 1940s, and that has
been more or less eschewed by most United States governmental author-
ities. This case may well be unique in its application of the moral rights
law of the forum country, where the infringing acts occurred entirely in
the United States.2°6 Surely this sequence of events was wholly unex-
pected by the American publisher.
b. Application of Moral Rights Law
Israeli law protects the rights of integrity and paternity; violation is
expressly made a tort.2'7 The right of paternity is expressed as follows:
"[a]n author is entitled to his creation being credited to his name in the
usual extent and measure." In Israeli law, as opposed to English law,
moral rights are not "dependent upon 'assertion' of identity of a work's
author."20" Instead, the right of paternity arises whenever the "work is
publicly presented or mentioned ' '2°"
In this case, it is unclear whether the court found that Qimron was
the sole owner of the copyright or whether he shared it with Prof.
decision in Huston creates exactly the problem contemplated supra note 198. The United States
producers of the colorized film now possess a product, legally made, that they cannot take where
they choose; this is disruptive, to say the least, of good order and certainty of ownership.
203. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 22, trans. at 13.
204. The place of publication of the book, which the judge classes as a state. Id. at 22,
trans. at 14.
205. Id.
206. Compare Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Corp., 538 F2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976),
which applied American copyright and trademark law to acts taking place in America, to the
Huston case, where the court applied French law to the existence and ownership of moral
rights in an American film where the infringing act took place in France, Ginsburg &
Sirinelli, supra note 21, at 137-38.
207. See supra note 117.
208. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 32, trans. at 30 (citing Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, ch. 48, arts. 77(1), 78 (Eng.)).
209. 3 [5753-1993] P.M. at 33, trans at 31 (quoting G. Tadesky).
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Strugnell. 210 If the copyright was shared, it is harder to see that attribu-
tion to Strugnell "with a colleague 21' would be unacceptable. 12
As noted, the foreword stated that the work had been done by Prof.
Strugnell and a colleague. The court found that this was insufficient
credit; apparently, any person who makes sufficient contribution to a
work to claim copyright as part of the common must be listed in-
dividually whenever the work is printed. This is probably excessive.
Strugnell was the person to whom the scroll had been assigned, and it
seems excessive to have to mention the names of all the members of a
research team who share the copyright every time a work is reproduced,
even in part. The case is murkier if Qimron is the only copyright holder.
Even in that case, however, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary,
it should still be sufficient to name the lead researcher, particularly
where, as here, the identity of the copyright holder is unclear even after
adjudication.
c. Damages
The court awarded the maximum available statutory damages for
infringement of copyright.213 The court found that Qimron had not
proven pecuniary damages, and therefore awarded him statutory damag-
es. 214 The court awarded the maximum in part because it found that the
defendants willfully infringed the copyright.2 15
The court then proceeded to award damages in tort for infringement
of the moral right. This award was based on the plaintiff's claim of
mental distress,2 16 rather than pecuniary loss. The court's stated goal was
to restore the status quo ante. However, the court said that:
At the same time, the Theory of Torts also recognizes con-
sideration for the conduct of the tortfeasor: First, in estimating non
pecuniary damages for a moral injury, increased damages can be
imposed according to the gravity of tortfeasor's conduct; second,
damages are imposed in pertinent cases, to punish the tortfeasor for
his behavior (exemplary damages[)]. In spite that imposition of
exemplary damages is a controversial matter, it has been pointed
210. See supra note 175.
211. Qimron v. Shanks, trans. at 10 (material omitted from official report of decision).
212. See Carson, supra note 148, at 330-31.
213. 3 [5753-1993] PM. at 39, trans at 42.
214. Id. at 37-39, trans. at 39-41.
215. Id. at 39, trans. at 41-42.
216. "[Qimron] has explained in his testimony that he had felt that his world had
crumbled and his dream to achieve fame had vanished." 4d. at 39, trans. at 42.
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out [in another case], that this controversy has become an academic
one, because increased damages include almost all the elements of
exemplary damages.217
The court does not differentiate between mental distress worsened by
willful conduct and thus more highly compensable, and punitive
damages intended to punish the willful conduct itself.
The court also awarded, as earlier noted, substantial attorney's fees.
The entire award was made subject to "indexation differentials," pegging
the value of the award in shekels to its dollar value at the time of the
award, so that, as the shekel's exchange value changes, the size of the
award in shekels will change proportionately.2 8
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF MORAL RIGHTS AND NON-EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES.
Having examined these two cases in detail, it is now worth stepping
back and examining why newly-industrialized and developing countries
might find it worthwhile to enforce moral rights. As noted, many
non-European nations are members of Berne; many are also members of
or will soon join the GATT, requiring muscular enforcement of their
Berne-compliant copyright laws. These countries have apparently adopt-
ed moral rights provisions without a qualm. There is little doubt that the
importance of intellectual property law is increasing. Yet the concerns
that developing countries raise about patents and even copyright general-
ly, do not seem to exist for moral rights. Indeed, many non-European
nations favor strong moral rights protection. 2 9 The reasons for their
advocacy are not entirely clear, in part because the economic impact of
moral rights has not been thoroughly examined.
A full discussion of the economics'of moral rights is well beyond
the scope of this note. This section will, however, briefly discuss some
possible economic effects of moral rights, and then suggest some rea-
sons why developing nations would not object to moral rights.
A. The Economic Effects of Moral Rights
Among the numerous articles written in the United States about
moral rights, none apparently deal in detail with the economic impact of
217. Id. at 40, trans. at 43-44 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 41, trans. at 44-45.
219. For example, several South American countries put forward a proposal to include
moral rights in TRIPS. STEWART, supra note 93, at 2279. Mexico and Uruguay opposed the
Stockholm Protocol to the Berne Convention, which reduced developing nations' obligations
under the treaty. RICKETSON, supra note 76, at 620.
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moral rights.22 ° Instead, they either advocate the morality of the rights,
or make dire predictions about the economic ruin of publishers and
movie makers from giving authors an inalienable and capricious right.22
This dearth of serious contemplation of the economic rationale and
impact of moral rights results, one suspects, from the misleading nature
of the term itself. Moral rights- are so named to distinguish them from
remunerative, "economic," rights. But both moral and remunerative
rights are legal rights, and, as legal rights, have economic consequences.
Hershel Shanks' testimony at the trial aptly demonstrates the problem.
When asked if Professor Qimron had a right to have his name as-
sociated with the MMT reconstruction, Mr. Shanks stated that "[h]e has
a moral right to credit, but no legal rights. 222 Mr. Shanks is a lawyer.
His statement shows the gulf in the American mind between moral
rights and legally cognizable ones, not recognizing that in many
countries they are identical.
B. The Economic Effects of Moral Rights'
on Authors and Users of Copyright
The principal American concerns with moral rights appear to deal
with the unsettling possibility that, for example, a novelist will complain
220. Landes and Posner do not deal with the moral rights in their seminal article.
For example, do such principles as droit moral, entitling authors to reclaim copy-
right from assignees after a fixed period of years or entitling artists to royalties on
resales of their art by initial (or subsequent) purchasers, increase or reduce the
incentive to create new works? The answer suggested by economic analysis is that,
contrary to intuition, such principles reduce the incentive to create by preventing
the author or artist from shifting risk to the publisher or dealer. A publisher (say)
who must share any future speculative gains with the author will pay the author
less for the work, so the risky component of the author's expected remuneration
will increase relative to the certain component. If the'author is risk averse, he will
be worse off as a result. However, we do not explore such matters in this article.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 325, 327 (1989) (footn6te omitted). Landes and Posner are not evaluating
moral rights at all, their statement to the contrary notwithstanding, but rather the droit de
suite, the author's right to remuneration on transfer of the copyright subsequent to the first,
which is an economic right. Compare Berne Convention arts. 14ter and 6bis: the droit de
suite is a remunerative right, though inalienable; moral rights are non-remunerative, although
the ability to transfer or waive is uncertain. Berne Convention, supra note 2, arts. 6bis, 14ter,
7 Copyright at 137, 139. As a deeper issue, Landes and Posner do not attempt to deal in
detail with cost and risk allocation between the author and the user. Landes & Posner, supra,
at 327. However, moral rights are a problem of risk allocation between these parties.
221. E.g. Hatch, supra note 1, at 184 (adoption of broad moral rights protection could
"alter drastically current domestic copyright relationships"); Gorman, supra note 1, at 423-24.
222., Hershel Shanks, supra note 164, at 71. It is not clear whether the court assigned
this statement any weight in its decision.
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about the quality and casting of the film adaptation of her work,223 or
that the director of a film will later complain over the final cut of the
work, or of its adaptation for television. Essentially, the concerns relate
to a prospective inability to reassign contract risks; that a warranty of
paternity and integrity will be inferred into all copyright-related con-
tracts, and that those rights will be exercisable for the term of copyright
or even longer. Thus moral rights impose a cost on users22 of copyright
that, in their view, did not exist before.
In fact, however, moral rights represent a means of allocating costs
between authors and users. The cost to authors does exist, although it
may be hidden in a system that does fails to provide or provides only
limited moral rights protection. The costs to authors are emotional, as in
the mental distress that comes from seeing one's work mutilated,225 as
well as economic, in the reduction in value of one's work caused by the
misattribution or the false depiction of the mutilated or distorted work.226
Qimron and Mannu Bhandari aptly present each form of damage. There
are costs to users in complying with the requirements of moral rights.
The users may lose some part of their audience, as in Mannu Bhandari,
where the filmmakers recast the film into the mold of the traditional
Hindi film, 227 or may have to invest more time and money into creating
a better work.228 The loss to the user may be more personal as well, as
the maker of the derivative work is forced to forego some of her own
creativity in modifying the work in favor of respecting the author's
integrity. It is hard, and may be impossible, to make axiomatic assump-
tions about the balance between the author's costs and the user's costs;
no doubt part of the user's calculus in a system that enforces moral
223. Anne Rice complained of the movie adaptation of her novel Interview with the
Vampire, concerned that the producers and the lead actor were "butchering her script, sanitiz-
ing the sexual content to accommodate [Tom Cruise's] clean-cut image, and perpetrating the
worst crime in the name of casting since The Bonfire of the Vanities." Jennet Conant, Lestat,
C'est Moi, EsQUIRE, Mar. 1994, at 71, 72. Rice later recanted. Rachel Abramowitz, Young
Blood: Filming of 'Interview With the Vampire,' PREMIERE, Nov. 1994, at 62 (quoting Anne
Rice: "They got it! I was swept away. Neil [Jordan, the director,] kept the heart and soul of
the book.").
224. The term is used here to include, for example, publishers, and filmmakers, as well
as those who pirate copyrighted works. Piracy represents the ultimate free ride, taking both
the economic rights in the copyrighted work and, in the event of distortion or misattribution,
the moral rights as well.
225. See Qimron v. Shanks, 3 [5753-1993] P.M. 10, 39-40, trans. at 42-44 (discussing
and awarding substantial damages for mental distress).
226. See Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd., 1987 A.I.R. (Del.) 13, 18
(1986) (discussing damage to reputation from a poor movie).
227. Id.
228. A better scriptwriter or translator might be more expensive; it might take longer to
produce the work or shoot the film.
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rights is the cost, for example, of a better translator versus the pos-
sibility of being mulcted heavily in damages for publishing a poor
translation.229
One can envision a number of moral rights regimes, each allocating
the costs and risks differently. A system that does not recognize moral
rights imposes the cost by default on the author, who takes the risk that
an unscrupulous user will damage her reputation by misattribution or by
distortion of her work. This does not allow risk-averse authors to accept
lower sums for a guarantee of no infringement of moral rights. A system
that provides uncertain recognition (as in the United States) allows some
degree of bargaining over risk; but in all probability, except for authors
with substantial bargaining power, the risk will nonetheless be placed on
the author, who will be insufficiently compensated for accepting it. A
system that allows for full-recognition of moral rights but also for
assignment or waiver by contract would similarly keep risks on authors
who lack sufficient bargaining power to refuse waiver or those who seek
increased payment for shouldering the risk. However, the costs to the
user, both in compensation to the author and transaction costs, will be
somewhat higher, since such waiver must be bargained for expressly.
Finally, a system that provides inalienable and unwaivable moral rights
places the cost of violation squarely and solely on the user, but does not
allow the possibility of increased rents for the risk-accepting author.
Where moral rights are a default rule subject to negotiation and the
parties have equal bargaining power, the author will demand a higher
price for assuming the risk of violation, or accept a lower one for plac-
ing the risk on the user. The price will reflect the cost of the possible
damage and the degree of risk.
Most authors, however, probably do not possess bargaining power
equal to that of the user. In that case, as also where such rights are
uncertain, the user can force the author to bear a disproportionate part of
the risk and cost of violation. Thus, it would seem that, in the absence
of equal bargaining power between authors and users, inalienable and
unwaivable moral rights are the only ones that fully prevent users from
externalizing the costs of infringement. However, while inalienable and
unwaivable rights protect the weak or risk-averse author, they reduce the
229. Infringement of moral rights, for economic purposes rather than choice of law, may
best be viewed as a form of intentional tort; the user decides to break an artwork into its
component pieces and sell them individually, or the movie maker decides to change the
ending of a book. For views of the economics of intentional torts in general, see William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 127 (1981); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Com-
ment, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1983).
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possible return to the risk-accepting author. It may be that allowing
waiver or alienation of the moral right would result in the greatest net
gain over all authors, risk-accepting and risk-averse.
C. Moral Rights and the Least-Cost Risk Avoider
The logical questions in debating moral rights, then, are what is the
appropriate default rule for allocation of the costs of moral rights infr-
ingement, and to what degree may parties choose to reallocate the costs
and risks by contract? Moral right infringement is analogous to defama-
tion, a tort. The usual rule in tort law is that risks are most appropriately
borne by the least-cost risk avoider. 230 The least-cost risk avoider in
moral rights is the user of the copyright. The copyright owner has little
direct control over the use made of her work once she has assigned it to
another. For example, it may not be practical for a novelist to examine
every revision of the screenplay of her novel, nor is she likely to pos-
sess the technical skill to determine whether the quality of the film
shooting, editing, and acting will do justice to her work. The filmmaker
in this case is more likely to have such knowledge. 2 1 The author likely
is limited to making the assignment based only on her impression of the
reputation of the assignee, an ephemeral and Uncertain characteristic at
best, particularly if the author has no control over subsequent assign-
ment.
This line of argument suggests that the user is the least-cost risk
avoider, and thus best suited 'to bear the cost of violation of moral
rights. If the user does not want to pay the cost, she simply has to
ensure that she works within the law's constraints.
D. The Costs and Benefits of Moral Rights
in Non-European Countries
Where, then, does this put non-European countries, developing or
newly industrialized? Many of these countries joined the Berne Union
shortly after gaining independence. Several commentators suggest,
however, that the decision to accede to Berne was frequently the result
of pressure to join from former colonial rulers.232 These countries only
belatedly realized that the high level of protection that the Berne Con-
230. Israel's explicit treatment of moral rights violation as tort is particularly apposite.
See supra text accompanying note 216.
231. And, as to the right of paternity, to have control over the credits to the film.
232. Nora Maija Tocups, The Development of Special Provisions in International
Copyright Law for the Benefit of Developing Countries, 29 J. COPYIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 402,
406-07 (1982).
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vention required was ill-suited to their needs for, among others, inex-
pensive educational material.233 Their concerns led to the negotiations
that culminated in the Appendix to the Berne Convention adopted at
Paris in 1971.234 However, they apparently never objected to the moral
rights provisions of the Berne Convention.235
Moral rights laws serve to protect national authors against damage
by other nationals, as in Mannu Bhandari, and by foreigners, as in
Qimron. Moral rights require indigenous industries to operate at a higher
level of sophistication than would otherwise be the case. Although the
cost of producing works thereby increases, suggesting lower production,
the lower risks to authors might induce more to publish for reduced
payment demands. In addition, some externalities might also be viewed
as justification, such as improved reputation of indigenous authors and
publishers outside the country. It seems likely that the importance of the
indigenous protection rationale increases in proportion to the growth of
copyright industries.236 Again, it is no surprise that the cases discussed
in this paper come from countries with such substantial industries.
233. Id at 409-10; RICKETSON, supra note 76, at 590-91.
234. The Appendix replaced the Protocol to the Berne Convention that had been adopted
at Stockholm in 1967 but which never went into effect, and which proved to be highly
controversial. RiCKETSON, supra note 76, at 621. The Appendix represented a more measured
approach to the problems of developing countries and was coordinated with revisions to the
Universal Copyright Convention. Id. at 631-33. The Appendix provides for compulsory
licensing of certain materials in countries that meet the United Nations definition of develop-
ing country.
235. Countries availing themselves of the provisions of the Appendix are not forgiven
compliance with the requirements of article 6bis. See Tocups, supra note 232, at 417-18. The
Appendix requires that "[d]ue provision shall be made by national legislation to ensure a
correct translation of the work, or an accurate reproduction of the particular edition, as the
case may be." Berne Convention, supra note 2, Appendix, art. IV, para. 6(b), 7 COPYRIGHT at
148. One suspects that the developing nations did not object to retention of moral rights in
part because of the cost-bearing issue discussed above. The compulsory licensing system
allows users in developing countries to pay "just compensation," which is presumably a
smaller amount than had been demanded by the author. Developed countries would view it as
unfair that the author's "fee" could be reduced still further through forcing her to bear the risk
costs of damage to reputation from infringement of moral rights. In addition these countries'
legal systems had recognized these rights, at least theoretically, from accession to Beme and,
presumably for non-common law countries, prior to independence as well. It is easy to
overstate the impact of the Appendix, as few countries have availed themselves of its
provisions. RICKETSON, supra note 76, at 663. However, the Appendix may serve as a useful
bargaining chip; the availability of the compulsory license may have induced authors to
license voluntarily. Id.
236. A number of authors have examined the relationship between intellectual property
protection and economic growth in developing countries. See Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say,
Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 84 (1992) (discussing threshold level of develop-
ment at which protection benefits exceed costs); Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek,
Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, J. WORLD
TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 75 (finding that benefits substantially exceed costs).
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Presumably, as other nations develop these industries, wider interest in
and more frequent occasion for enforcement of moral rights will follow.
CONCLUSION
Moral rights laws play an important role in the copyright systems of
many countries outside Europe and North America. As the sophistication
of copyright industries in these countries increases, so to will active
enforcement of moral rights. Moral rights, while infrequently litigated,
perform an important cost- and risk-shifting function, reducing or pre-
venting users of copyrighted materials from externalizing the costs of
violating the integrity of the work or failing to credit the author.
As United States actors become more involved in activities in these
countries, they will need to become more aware of and accommodating
towards these laws in planning and contracting. Indeed, these rights may
crop up in very unexpected places, as occurred in Qimron.237 The un-
wary, then, proceed at their peril. But these rights can also be viewed as
a valuable tool for foreign authors and publishers seeking to recover for
piracy or to ensure that local assignees produce high quality translations,
editions, or adaptations. The greater emphasis on intellectual property
generally, heralded by TRIPS, may also produce an increased emphasis
on these oft-neglected rights as well.
237. "The Huston case thus reminds us that moral rights remain a wild card in interna-
tional copyright commerce." Geller, supra note 73, at 256. On the other hand, as the Director
General of WIPO once pointed out, "[m]any magazines are published in Europe, not-
withstanding moral rights, so why the concern?" Brown, supra note 1, at 208 (quoting Arpad
Bogsch). Brown continues by noting that authors are driven by economic concerns, and that
moral rights cases come from broken relationships, not continuing ones. Id. at 208-09.
However, moral rights do underlie continuing relationships, and those relationships are
molded by the obligations of the user. And some relationships, such as Mannu Bhandari's
break down, at least in part, because of infringement of moral rights.
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